We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu exchange markets with linear utilities. Our algorithm is based on a variant of the weakly-polynomial Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm. We use the DM algorithm as a subroutine to identify revealed edges, i.e. pairs of agents and goods that must correspond to best bang-per-buck transactions in every equilibrium solution. Every time a new revealed edge is found, we use another subroutine that decides if there is an optimal solution using the current set of revealed edges, or if none exists, finds the solution that approximately minimizes the violation of the demand and supply constraints. This task can be reduced to solving a linear program (LP). Even though we are unable to solve this LP in strongly polynomial time, we show that it can be approximated by a simpler LP with two variables per inequality that is solvable in strongly polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
The exchange market model has been introduced by Walras in 1874 [42] . In this model, a set of agents arrive at a market with an initial endowment of divisible goods and have a utility function over allocations of goods. Agents can use their revenue from selling their initial endowment to purchase their preferred bundle of goods. In a market equilibrium, the prices are such that each agent can spend their entire revenue on a bundle of goods that maximizes her utility at the given prices, and all goods are fully sold.
The celebrated result of Arrow and Debreu [2] shows the existence of an equilibrium for a broad class of utility functions. Computational aspects have been already addressed since the 19th century, see e.g. [3] , and polynomial time algorithms have been investigated in the theoretical computer science community over the last twenty years; see the survey [4] for early work, and the references in [18] for more recent developments.
In this paper we study the case where all utility functions are linear. Linear market models have been extensively studied since 1950s; see [9] for an overview of earlier work. These models are also appealing from a combinatorial optimization perspective due to their connection to classical network flow models and their rich combinatorial structure. A well-studied special case of the exchange market is the Fisher market setting, where every buyer arrives with a fixed budget instead of an endowment of goods. Using network flow techniques, Devanur et al. [10] gave a polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm that was followed by a series of further such algorithms [21, 37] , including strongly polynomial ones [32, 40] . A combinatorial algorithm for the general exchange market was developed much later by Duan and Mehlhorn [13] , and no strongly polynomial algorithm has been known thus far.
Strongly polynomial algorithms and rational convex programs. Assume that a problem is given by an input of N rational numbers given in binary description. An algorithm for such a problem is strongly polynomial (see [23, Section 1.3] ), if it only uses elementary arithmetic operations (addition, comparison, multiplication, and division), and the total number of such operations is bounded by poly(N ). Further, the algorithm is required to run in polynomial space: that is, the size of the numbers occurring throughout the algorithm remain polynomially bounded in the size of the input. Here, the size of a rational number p/q with integers p and q is defined as ⌈log 2 (|p| + 1)⌉ + ⌈log 2 (|q| + 1)⌉.
It is a major open question to find a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear programming. Such algorithms are known for special classes of linear optimization problems. We do not present a comprehensive overview here but only highlight some examples: systems of linear equations with at most two nonzero entries per inequality [1, 5, 28] ; minimum cost circulations e.g. [22, 31, 34] ; LPs with bounded entries in the constraint matrix [35, 36] ; generalized flow maximization [30, 41] , and variants of Markov Decision Processes [43, 45] .
For nonlinear convex optimization, only sporadic results are known. The relevance of certain market equilibrium problems in this context is that they can be described by rational convex programs, where a rational optimal solution exists with encoding size bounded in the input size (see [38] ). This property gives hope for finding strongly polynomial algorithms.
The linear Fisher market equilibrium can be captured by two different convex programs, one by Eisenberg and Gale [16] , and one by Shmyrev [33] . These are special cases of natural convex extensions of classical network flow models [39, 40] . In particular, the second model is a network flow problem with a separable convex cost function; [40] provides a strongly polynomial algorithm for the linear Fisher market using this general perspective.
The exchange market model is not known to be described by such simple convex programs. A rational convex program was given in [9] , but the objective is not separable and hence the result in [40] cannot be applied. Previous convex programs [6, 24, 29] included nonlinear constraints and did not appear amenable for a combinatorial approach (see [9] for an overview).
Model. Let A be the set of n agents. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there is one unit in total of each divisible good, and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between agents and goods: agent i brings the entire unit of the i-th good, д i to the market. If agent i buys x i j units of good д j , her utility is j u i j x i j , where u i j is the utility of agent i for a unit amount of good д j . Given prices p = (p i ) i ∈A , the bundle that maximizes the utility of agent i is any choice of maximum bang-per-buck goods, that is, goods that maximize the ratio u i j /p j . The prices p and allocations (x i j ) i, j ∈A form a market equilibrium, if (i) i ∈A x i j = 1 for all j, that is, every good is fully sold; (ii) p i = j ∈A p j x i j for all i, that is, every agent spends her entire revenue; and (iii) x i j > 0 implies that u i j /p j = max k u ik /p k , that is, all purchases maximize bang-per-buck.
Algorithms for the linear exchange market. A finite time algorithm based on Lemke's scheme [27] was obtained by Eaves [14] . A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium was described by Gale [17] . The first polynomial-time algorithms for the problem were given by Jain [24] using the ellipsoid method and by Ye [44] using an interior point method. The combinatorial algorithm of Duan and Mehlhorn [13] builds on the algorithm [10] for linear Fisher markets. An improved variant was given in [12] with the current best weakly polynomial running time O(n 7 log 3 (nU )), assuming all u i j values are integers between 0 and U . A main measure of progress in these algorithms is the increase in prices. However, the upper bound on the prices depends on the u i j values; therefore, such an analysis can only provide a weakly polynomial bound. The existence of a strongly polynomial algorithm is described in [13] as a major open question. There is a number of simple algorithms for computing an approximate equilibrium [11, 19, 20, 25] , but these do not give rise to polynomial-time exact algorithms.
Our result. We provide a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets with running time O(n 10 log 2 n). Let us give an overview of the main ideas and techniques. Let F * denote the set of edges (pairs of agents and goods) that correspond to a best bangper-buck transaction in every equilibrium. In the algorithm, we maintain a set F ⊆ F * called revealed edges, and the main progress is adding a new edge in strongly polynomial time. At a high level, this approach resembles that of [40] , which extends Orlin's approach for minimum-cost circulations [31] .
In a money allocation (p, f ), (p i ) i ∈A is a set of prices and (f i j ) i, j ∈A represent the amount of money paid for good д j by agent i; f i j may only be positive for maximum bang-per-buck pairs. In the algorithm we work with a money allocation where goods may not be fully sold and agents may have leftover money; we let ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 denote the total surplus money left, and ∥s(p, f )∥ ∞ the maximum surplus of any good. It can be shown that if f i j > ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 in a money allocation, then (i, д j ) ∈ F * . This is analogous to the method of identifying abundant arcs for minimum cost flows by Orlin [31] .
We use a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm to identify abundant arcs. We show that ϕ(p, f ) = ∥s(p, f )∥ ∞ /( j p j ) 1/n decreases geometrically in the algorithm; from this fact, it is not difficult to see that an arc with f i j > ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 appears in a strongly polynomial number of iterations, yielding the first revealed arc. We need to modify the DM algorithm [13] so that, among other reasons, the potential decreases geometrically when we run the algorithm starting with any arbitrary price vector p; see Remark 4.1 for all the differences.
To identify subsequent revealed arcs, we need a more flexible framework and a second subroutine. We work with the more general concept of F -allocations, where the money amount f i j could be negative if (i, д j ) ∈ F . This is a viable relaxation since an F -equilibrium (namely, a market equilibrium with possibly negative allocations in F ) can be efficiently turned into a proper market equilibrium, provided that F ⊆ F * . Given a set F of revealed arcs, our Price Boost subroutine finds an approximately optimal F -allocation using only edges in F . Namely, the subroutine finds an F -equilibrium if there exists one; otherwise, it finds an F -allocation that is zero outside F , and subject to this, it approximately minimizes ϕ(p, f ). This will provide the initial prices for the next iteration of the DM subroutine. Since DM decreases ϕ(p, f ) geometrically, after a strongly polynomial number iterations it will need to send a substantial amount of flow on an edge outside F , providing the next revealed edge.
Let us now discuss the Price Boost subroutine. The analogous subproblem for Fisher markets in [40] reduces to a simple variant of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm. For exchange markets, we show that optimizing ϕ(p, f ) can be captured by a linear program. A strongly polynomial LP algorithm would therefore immediately provide the desired subroutine. Alas, this LP is not contained in any special class of LP where strongly polynomial algorithms are currently known.
We will exploit the following special structure of the LP. We can eliminate the f i j variables and only work with price variables. The objective is to maximize the sum of all variables over a feasible set of the form P ∩ P ′ . The first polyhedron P is defined by inequalities with one positive and one nonnegative variable per inequality. The constraint matrix defining the second polyhedron P ′ is what we call a Z + -matrix: all off-diagonal elements are nonpositive but all column sums are nonnegative. This corresponds to a submatrix of the transposed of a weighted Laplacian matrix. In case we only had constraints of the form P, classical results [1, 5, 28] would provide a strongly polynomial running time. To deal with the constraints defining P ′ , we approximate our LP by a second LP that can be solved in strongly polynomial time.
More precisely, we replace the second polyhedron P ′ by Q such that 1 n 2 Q ⊆ P ′ ⊆ Q, and that Q is also a system with one positive and one nonnegative variable per inequality. Thus, the algorithms [1, 5, 28] are applicable to maximize the sum of the variables over P ∩ Q in strongly polynomial time. For an optimal solutionp, the vectorp/n 2 is feasible to the original LP and the objective value is within a factor n 2 of the optimum. For the purposes of identifying a new revealed arc in the algorithm, such an approximation of the optimal ϕ(p, f ) value already suffices.
The construction of the approximating polyhedron Q is obtained via a general method applicable for systems given by Z + -matrices. We show that for such systems, Gaussian elimination can be used to generate valid constraints with at most two nonzero variables per row. Moreover, we show that the intersection of all relevant such constraints provides a good approximation of the original polyhedron.
The full version of the paper, including all proofs, is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06266. The rest of this extended abstract is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces basic definitions and notation. Section 3 describes the overall algorithm by introducing the notion of F -allocations, the main potential, and the two necessary subroutines. Section 4 presents the first of these two subroutines, a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm. Section 5 shows how the second subroutine, Price Boost, can be reduced to solving an LP. Section 6 gives a sketch of the polyhedral approximation result for Z + -matrices. Section 7 concludes with some open questions.
PRELIMINARIES
For a positive integer t, we let [t] := {1, 2, . . . , t }, and for k < t, we let [k, t] := {k, k + 1, . . . , t }. For a vector a ∈ R n , we let
|a i | denote the ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , and ℓ ∞ -norms, respectively. Further, for a vector a ∈ R n , we let supp(a) ⊆ [n] denote its support, that is, supp(a) := {i ∈ [n] | a i 0}. For a subset S ⊆ [n], we let a(S) := i ∈S a i .
The linear exchange market. We let A := [n] denote the set of agents, G := {д 1 , д 2 , . . . , д n } denote the set of goods, and u i j ≥ 0 denote the utility of agent i for a unit amount of good д j . Let E ⊆ A × G denote the set of pairs (i, д j ) such that u i j > 0; let m := |E|. We will assume that for each i ∈ A there exists a д j ∈ G such that u i j > 0, and for each д j ∈ G there exists an i ∈ A such that u i j > 0. Hence, m ≥ n.
The goods are divisible and there is one unit of each in total. Agent i arrives to the market with her initial endowment comprising exactly the unit of good д i . As mentioned in the introduction, the general case with an arbitrary set of goods and arbitrary initial endowments can be easily reduced to this setting; see [9, 24] .
Let p = (p j ) д j ∈G denote the prices where p j is the price of good д j . Given prices p, we let
For each agent i ∈ A, the goods satisfying equality here are called maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) goods; for such a good д j , (i, д j ) is called an MBB edge. We let MBB(p) ⊆ E denote the set of MBB edges at prices p.
For the money allocation (p, f ), the surplus of agent i is defined as
and the surplus of good д j ∈ G is defined as
Parts (iii) and (iv) in the definition of the money allocation require that the surplus of all agents and goods are nonnegative. We let
surplus vectors of the agents and the goods, respectively. Clearly,
Existence of an equilibrium. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium can be given as follows. Let us define the directed graph (A,Ē), where (i, j) ∈Ē if and only if This condition can be easily checked in strongly polynomial time. Further, it is easy to see that if the above condition holds, then finding an equilibrium in an arbitrary input can be reduced to finding an equilibrium in an input where the digraph (A,Ē) is strongly connected. Thus, we will assume the following throughout the paper:
The graph (A,Ē) is strongly connected.
(⋆)
THE OVERALL ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe the overall algorithm. We formulate the statements that are needed to prove our main theorem:
There exists a strongly polynomial algorithm that computes a market equilibrium in linear exchange markets in time O(n 10 log 2 n).
We start by introducing the concepts of revealed edges, F -money allocations, and balanced F -flows.
Revealed Edges
Throughout the paper, we let F * ⊆ E denote the set of edges (i, д j ) ∈ E that are MBB edges for every market equilibrium (p, f ). In the algorithm, we will maintain a subset of edges F ⊆ F * that will be called the revealed edge set. This is initialized as F = ∅.
Note that f i j could be negative for (i, д j ) ∈ F . A ∅-allocation simply corresponds to a money allocation.
The main progress step in the algorithm will be adding new edges to F . This will be enabled by the following lemma.
The proof is given in the full version. It is a proof by contradiction, comparing the sets of MBB goods at prices p and at an equilibrium where (k, д ℓ ) is not an MBB good.
Our algorithm will obtain an F -equilibrium. Whereas an F -equilibrium is not necessarily an equilibrium, the following holds true:
The proof is via a maximum flow computation in an auxiliary network. We let Final-Flow(p) denote the algorithm as in the Lemma.
Balanced Flows
Balanced flows play a key role in the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm [13] , as well as in previous algorithms for Fisher market models [10, 21, 37] . We now introduce the natural extension for F -allocations. Definition 3.3. Given an edge set F ⊆ E and prices p, we say that
We let Balanced(F , p) denote the subroutine guaranteed by the Lemma.
The Algorithm
The overall algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. The main progress is gradually expanding a revealed edge set F ⊆ F * , initialized as F = ∅. Every cycle of the algorithm performs the subroutines Boost(F ) and DM(F ,p), and at least one new edge is added to F at every such cycle. Once an F -equilibrium is obtained for the current F , we use the subroutine Final-Flow(p) as in Lemma 3.2 to compute a market equilibrium.
Algorithm 1: Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
Input : Set A of agents, set G of goods, and utilities
We now introduce the key potential measures used in analysis.
Theorem 3.4. There exists a strongly polynomial time algorithm that for any input F ⊆ E, returns in time O(n 4 log 2 n) an F -allocation
The algorithm in the theorem will be denoted as Boost(F ), and is described in Section 5. In particular, if Ψ(F ) = 0, then Boost(F ) returns an F -equilibrium.
The second main subroutine DM(F ,p), is a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm [13] , described in Section 4. As the input, it uses the pricesp obtained in the F -allocation (p,f ) returned by Boost(F ), and outputs an F -allocation (p, f ) such that either ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 = 0, that is, an F -equilibrium, or it is guaranteed that f i j > ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 for some (i, д j ) ∈ E \F connecting two different connected components of F . Such an edge (i, д j ) can be added to F by Lemma 3.1. The following simple lemma asserts the existence of such an edge.
There exists a strongly polynomial O(n 9 log 2 n) time algorithm, that, for a given F ⊆ E and pricesp, computes an F -allocation (p, f ) such that
wheref is the balanced flow computed by Balanced(F ,p).
The algorithm DM(F ,p) given in Section 4 will satisfy the assertion of this theorem. Using these claims, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 3.4, the number of connected components of F decreases after every cycle of Algorithm 1; thus, the total number of cycles is ≤ 2n − 1. Consider any cycle. Let (p,f ) denote that F -allocation returned by Boost(F ) with ϕ(p,f ) ≤ (n − 1) 2 Ψ(F ), and let (p,f ) denote the balanced F -flow at pricesp. Then, Then, the agents are sorted in decreasing order of surplus. Without loss of generality, we assume that c 1 (p, f ) ≥ · · · ≥ c n (p, f ). Then, we find the smallest ℓ for which the ratio c ℓ (p, f )/c ℓ+1 (p, f ) is more than 1 + 1/n. If there is no such ℓ then we let ℓ := n. Let S be the set of first ℓ agents, and let Γ(S) be the set of goods for which there is a non-zero flow from agents in S. Since f is balanced, the agents outside S have zero flow to goods in Γ(S), i.e., f i j = 0, ∀i S, д j ∈ Γ(S) and the surplus of every good in Γ(S) is zero. We set γ to 1 before we go into the inner loop.
Next, the algorithm runs the inner loop where it increases the prices of goods in Γ(S) and the flow between agents in S and goods in Γ(S) by a multiplicative factor x ≥ 1 until one of the three events occurs. Observe that except for the MBB edges (i, д j ) where i S, д j ∈ Γ(S), all MBB edges remain MBB with this price change, and the surplus of every good in Γ(S) remains zero. When prices of goods in Γ(S) increase, an edge (i, д j ) from i ∈ S and д j Γ(S) can become MBB. We need to stop when such an event occurs in order to maintain an F -allocation. This is captured by Event 1. In Event 2, we stop when the surplus of an agent i ∈ S becomes equal to either the surplus of an agent i ′ S or zero. Let us note that c i (p, f ) ≥ 0 is maintained throughout; we use the expression max{max i S c i (p, f ), 0} to also cover the possible case S = [n]. In Event 3, we stop when γ x becomes 1 + 1/(56e 2 n 3 ).
If Event 1 occurs, then we have a new MBB edge (a, д b ) from a ∈ S to д b Γ(S). Using this new edge, it is now possible to Algorithm 2: DM(F ,p) Input : Utilities (u i j ) i ∈A,д j ∈G , an edge set F ⊆ E, and priceŝ p with F ⊆ MBB(p).
Sort the agents in decreasing order of surplus, i.e.,
Find the smallest ℓ for which c ℓ (p, f )/c ℓ+1 (p, f ) > 1 + 1/n, and let ℓ = n when there is no such ℓ.
Increase x continuously up from 1 until one of the following events occurs 22 until either f i j > ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 for an edge (i, д j ) ∈ E \ F with i and д j in different components of F , or ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 = 0 23 return (p, f ) decrease the surplus of agent a and increase the surpluses of agents i S by increasing f ab and decreasing f ib . We next check if this can lead to making the surplus of an agent i ∈ S and i ′ S equal. Observe that it is always possible if there exists an edge (i ′ , д b ) ∈ F . If yes, then we break from the inner loop, otherwise we update flow so that agent a buys the entire good д b , add д b to Γ(S), update γ to γ x, and go for another iteration. Proof. Consider the iterations of a phase. At the beginning of every iteration, the size of Γ(S) grows by 1, and hence there cannot be more than n iterations in a phase. □ When we break from the inner loop, we recompute a balanced flow and then check if either ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 is zero or there is an edge (i, д j ) F with f i j > ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 connecting two different components of F . If yes, then we return the current (p, f ), otherwise we go for another phase. Next, we show that (p, f ) remains an F -allocation throughout the algorithm, which implies that the algorithm returns an F -allocation. Proof. We only need to show that F ⊆ MBB(p) throughout the algorithm. Observe that an MBB edge (i, д j ) becomes non-MBB only if i S and д j ∈ Γ(S), where S and Γ(S) are obtained with respect to a balanced flow f . If an edge (i, д j ) ∈ F is such that i S and д j ∈ Γ(S) then it contradicts that f is a balanced flow because the edges in F are allowed to carry negative flow. □
The running time analysis of Algorithm 2 is based on the evolution of the norm ∥c(p, f )∥ 2 and prices p. If a phase terminates due to Event 3, then we call it price-rise, otherwise balancing. The next two lemmas are crucial that eventually imply that the potential function ϕ(p, f ) decreases substantially within a strongly polynomial number of phases. The proof of the next lemma is an adaptation of the proof in [12] , and is given in the full version, along with the definition of the auxiliary network N (p, F ). In the next lemma, we show that the potential function ϕ(p, f ) decreases by a large factor within a strongly polynomial number of phases. This together with Lemmas 3.4 and 3.1 imply that every major cycle terminates in strongly polynomial time.
Lemma 4.6. The potential function ϕ(p, f ) decreases by a factor of at least 1/n γ in 4(2 + γ ) 2 C 2 n 6 ln 2 n phases of Algorithm 2 for any γ > 0, where C = 56e 2 . □ Proof of Theorem 3.5. According to the above lemma, if we do not terminate Algorithm 2 in the first iteration when an arc (i, д j ) ∈ E \ F with f i j > ∥s(p, f )∥ 1 is found, then the potential ϕ(p, f ) decreases by a factor n 4 (m + 1) within O(n 6 log 2 n) phases.
For a strongly polynomial algorithm, we also need to keep all intermediate numbers polynomial bit length. For this, we can use the Duan-Mehlhorn [13] technique by restricting the prices and update factor x to powers of (1 + 1/L) where L has polynomial bit length. This guarantees that all arithmetic is performed on rational numbers of polynomial bit length. As shown in [13] this does not change the number of iterations of the DM subroutine. □ Remark 4.1. Compared to the original DM algorithm in [13] , Algorithm 2 differs in the following.
(1) We handle Event 1 (in line 10) differently than the other two events and this gives rise to two nested loops, unlike [13] where every event is handled similarly and there is only one loop.
(2) The edges in F are allowed to carry negative flow, unlike [13] where flow is always non-negative. (3) We initialize prices to p, unlike [13] where every price is initialized to 1. And, we stop when a new edge is revealed.
A LINEAR PROGRAM FOR Ψ(F )
In this section, we first formulate an LP to compute Ψ(F ). Then, we introduce the class of Z + -matrices, and formulate a general statement (Theorem 5.3) that shows how certain LPs with a Z + constraint matrix can be approximated by a two variable per inequality system. We use this to prove Theorem 3.4. The proof of Theorem 5.3 will be given in Section 6. Given F ⊆ E, we consider the bipartite graph (A ∪ G, F ). Let C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C t denote the connected components that have a nonempty intersection with G. (In particular, we include all isolated vertices in G, but not those in A.) Let γ i := |C i ∩ G |. Let us fix an arbitrary good in each of these components; for simplicity of notation, let us assume that the fixed good in C i is д i .
If all edges in F are forced to be MBB edges, then fixing the price p i of д i uniquely determines the prices of all goods in C i ∩G. Indeed, for any buyer k ∈ C i ∩ A, and any goods д ℓ , д ℓ ′ ∈ C i ∩ G with kℓ, kℓ ′ ∈ F , we have that p ℓ /p ℓ ′ = u k ℓ /u k ℓ ′ . Consequently, for any i ∈ [t], and for any д ℓ ∈ C i ∩ G, we can compute the multiplier θ i ℓ > 0 such that p ℓ = θ i ℓ p i whenever all edges in F are MBB. For an agent ℓ ∈ A, let ρ(ℓ) ∈ [t] denote the index of the component containing the good д ℓ of this agent: that is, д ℓ ∈ C ρ(ℓ) ∩ G, and p ℓ = θ ρ(ℓ)ℓ p ρ(ℓ) . Let Θ i := д ℓ ∈C i ∩G θ i ℓ ; the total price of the goods in C i is Θ i p i .
Constructing the LP
The variables (p i ) i ∈[t ] uniquely determine the price of every good. We can formulate the problem of computing Ψ(F ) in terms of these variables. To differentiate between this t-dimensional price vector and the n-dimensional price vector of all goods, we say that for a price vectorp ∈ R t , the vector p ∈ R n is the extension ofp, if p ℓ = θ ρ(ℓ)ℓpρ(ℓ) for all ℓ ∈ [n] (in particular, p ℓ =p ℓ for ℓ ∈ [t]).
We also say that the F -allocation (p, f ) is an extension ofp, if p is the extension ofp. We now formulate linear constraints that ensure that a vector p ∈ R t can be extended to an F -allocation (p, f ) with ∥s(p, f )∥ ∞ ≤ 1, and supp(f ) ⊆ F . The first set of constraints will enforce that all edges in F are MBB, and the second set will guarantee the existence of a desired money flow f with the surplus bounds.
First, the edges in F are MBB if and only if u k j /p j ≤ u k j ′ /p j ′ for any k ∈ A, and any д j , д j ′ ∈ G such that (k, д j ) ∈ E, (k, д j ′ ) ∈ F . The θ i ℓ coefficients already capture that equality holds if (k, д j ), (k, д j ′ ) ∈ F . For the rest of the pairs, we can express this constraint in terms of thep variables as
We add a second set of constraints for ∥s(p, f )∥ ∞ ≤ 1. Since f is supported on F and is allowed to be negative, this can be guaranteed if and only if for any component C i , i ∈ [t], the total price of the goods in C i ∩ G exceeds the total budget of the agents in C i ∩ A by at most γ i = |C i ∩ G |. Recall that given the pricesp of the fixed goods, the total price of goods in C i ∩ G is Θ ipi . We obtain the constraints
Let us now define the following LP: constraint set (2),
Example. Let us show the formulation for the example in Figure 1 . The variables arep 1 ,p 2 ,p 3 ,p 4 , andp 5 . From the constraint set (2), we only show the example of k = 6, j = 8, and j ′ = 3: 3p 3 − 2p 2 ≤ 0. For the components, we have
Lemma 5.1. (i) Any solutionp ∈ R n to (P F ) can be extended to an F -allocation (p, f ) with ∥s(p, f )∥ ∞ ≤ 1, and supp(f ) ⊆ F . (ii) If (P F ) is bounded, then there exists a pointwise maximal solutionp * ∈ R t , that is,p ≤p * for any solutionp ∈ R t to (P F ). Let (p * , f * ) denote the extension of these prices to an Fallocation with ∥s(p * , f * )∥ ∞ ≤ 1, and supp(f * ) ⊆ F . Then, Ψ(F ) = ϕ(p * , f * ).
(iii) Under assumption (⋆), every nonzero solution to (P 0 F ) is strictly positive. Such a solution can be extended to an F -equilibrium. □
Monotone Two Variable Per Inequality Systems
Let M 2 (m, n) denote the set of m × n rational matrices such that every matrix contains at most one positive and at most one negative entry per row. For a matrix A ∈ M 2 (m, n), and an arbitrary vector b ∈ Q m , the LP Ax ≤ b is called a monotone two variable per inequality system, abbreviated as M2VPI. In every such system, whenever the objective function max i x i is bounded, there exists a pointwise maximal feasible solution, that is, a feasible x * such that for every feasible solution x, x ≤ x * . This property holds more generally. Namely, a matrix is called pre-Leontief if every column contains at most one positive element. If A ⊤ is pre-Leontief, then the system A ⊤ x ≤ c has a pointwise maximal feasible solution whenever max i x i is bounded [7] . Whereas M2VPI systems are strongly polynomially solvable, as stated in the next theorem, no such algorithm is known for the general pre-Leontief setting.
Theorem 5.1 ([1, 5, 28] ). Consider an M2VPI system Ax ≤ b with A ∈ M 2 (m, n). Then there exists a strongly polynomial O(mn log m+ mn 2 log 2 n) time algorithm that finds a feasible solution or concludes infeasibility. Further, if there exists a pointwise maximal feasible solution, the algorithm also finds that one.
Note that this theorem is not directly applicable to (P F ). Whereas the constraints (2) are of the required form, the constraints (3) have only one positive coefficient but possibly multiple negative ones.
In what follows, we show that finding an approximate solution to (P F ) can be reduced to an M2VPI system.
Z + -Matrices
Let M ∈ R t ×t be the matrix representing the left hand side of the constraints in (3). That is, for all i, j ∈ [t], we let
Thus, (3) can be written as Mp ≤ γ , where γ ⊤ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ t ).
Definition 5.2. A matrix M ∈ Q k ×t is a Z + -matrix, if all offdiagonal entries are nonpositive, 1 and all column sums are nonnegative. We let Z + (k, t) denote the set of k × t Z + -matrices.
Clearly, the matrix M defined by (4) is in Z + (t, t). Recall that a matrix is called a Z -matrix if all off-diagonal entries are nonpositive; the notation reflects the additional requirement on the columns. Further, note that a matrix is a Z + (t, t)-matrix if and only if it is the transposed of a weighted Laplacian of a directed graph on t vertices, or if it can be obtained by deleting a row and a column of the transposed of a weighted Laplacian of a directed graph on t + 1 vertices. We will prove the following theorem on LPs with Z + -matrices as constraint matrices. Theorem 5.3. Given a matrix M ∈ Z + (k, t) with ℓ nonzero entries, and b ∈ Q k , with b > 0, we let
Further, the size of the entries inM andb will be polynomially bounded in the encoding size of the input.
Here, we use the notation αP = {αx : x ∈ P } for a set P and a constant α > 0. The proof of Theorem 5.3 will be given in Section 6; we now use it to derive Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Lemma 5.1 establishes that computing Ψ(F ) is equivalent to solving the LP (P F ). We construct a second LP Q F as follows. For the constraint set (3) in the form Mp ≤ γ , 1 For a non-square matrix, by diagonal entries we mean all entries z ii for 1 ≤ i ≤ min{k, t }.
we apply Theorem 5.3 to obtainMp ≤γ . Note that B ≤ n, since t i=1 γ i = n, and γ i ≥ 1 for i ∈ [t]. Then, we let Q F := {p ∈ R t :p satisfies (2) andMp ≤γ }.
Let P F denote the feasible region of (P F ). Using that all right hand sides in (2) are 0, we see that
Since Q F is an M2VPI system, Theorem 5.1 provides a strongly polynomial algorithm to obtain the pricesp maximizing t i=1p i over Q F , or concludes that this objective is unbounded on Q F . In case a finite optimum exists,p/n 2 is feasible to (P F ) and is within a factor n 2 from an optimal solution. If the objective is unbounded on Q F , then we claim that we can get a nonzero solution to (P 0 F ). Using LP duality, the objective is unbounded on Q F if and only if there is a feasible solutionp 0 to Q 0 F = {p ∈ R t :p satisfies (2) andMp ≤ 0}. Again, Theorem 5.1 is applicable to find a nonzero solution q. Suppose q 0 is a solution to Q 0 F . This implies that αq is a feasible solution to Q F for all α ≥ 0. Since for every feasible solutionp to Q F ,p/n 2 is a feasible solution to (P F ), this further implies that αq is also a feasible solution to (P F ) for all α ≥ 0. Therefore, q must be a solution to (P 0 F ). The number of nonzero entries in M is ≤ 2n. Thus, constructinḡ M andγ takes O(n 4 ) time. We obtain an M2VPI system with ≤ m+2n constraints and ≤ n variables, and m = O(n 2 ), thus the running time for solving the M2VPI system is O(n 4 log 2 n) that dominates the total running time.
Finally, for a strongly polynomial algorithm we also have to provide polynomial bounds on the encoding lengths of the numbers during the algorithm. The entries of M are simple expressions of the input parameters u i j . Then, Theorem 5.3 guarantees thatM and vectorγ also have bounded encoding length. Thus, the strongly polynomial M2VPI algorithm takes a polynomial size input and therefore the overall algorithm will be strongly polynomial. □
APPROXIMATING SYSTEMS WITH Z + -MATRICES
This section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5.3. For consistency with the market terminology, we usep ∈ R t as the variables.
Recall that we need to show that given a system P M = {p ∈ R t : Mp ≤ γ ,p ≥ 0} with M ∈ Z + (k, t) with ℓ nonzero entries and γ ∈ Q k , γ > 0, we can construct a matrixM ∈ M 2 (ℓ ′ , t) and
We will assume that k = t, that is, M is a square matrix. Indeed, if k > t, then the last k − t rows only contain nonpositive coefficients.
Therefore, for i > t, M ip ≤ 0 holds for everyp ≥ 0. If t > k, then by the Z + -property, all entries of the last t − k columns must be 0, and thus, we can delete these columns. We further assume that all diagonal entries are strictly positive; if M ii = 0 then we can remove the i-th row and i-th column similarly.
Let us also note that every matrix in Z + (t, t) can be obtained in the form (4), corresponding to a market problem with t components. We start by showing a lower bound on Mp.
Lower bounding the vector Mp. For i ∈ [t], we let λ i := j i γ j , and we let λ := (λ 1 , . . . , λ t ) ⊤ . Lemma 6.1. Let M ∈ Z + (t, t). Assume thatp ∈ R t + satisfies Mp ≤ γ . Then, we also have
Gaussian Elimination for Z + -Matrices
We will use Gaussian elimination to generate new constraints. For this purpose, we show that Gaussian elimination on Z + -matrices will only add nonnegative multiples of rows to other rows. Proof. Let T (k ) = Y (k ) T be the matrix after k steps in the Gaussian elimination with T (0) = T and Y (0) = I ℓ . By induction on k, we simultaneously show the following:
• Y (k ) is a nonnegative matrix;
Note that the last three properties imply that the lower right (ℓ − k) × (t − k) submatrix of T (k ) is a Z + -matrix.
The properties clearly hold for k = 0; assume we have proved these for k − 1. Consider the k-th iteration. If T (k −1) kk = 0, then no row operation is performed. In this case, we set T (k ) := T (k −1) and Y (k ) := Y (k−1) . We only need to verify that ℓ i=k +1 T (k ) i j ≥ 0 for j ∈ [k + 1, t]. This follows from the induction hypotheses:
If T (k −1) kk > 0, then we multiply the k-th row by 1/T (k −1) kk , and add −T (k −1) ik /T (k −1) kk times the k-th row to the i-th row for all i ∈ [k+1, ℓ]. By induction, these coefficients are all nonnegative. We update the transformation matrix Y (k) accordingly, and thus it remains a nonnegative matrix. Consider now the j-th column of
The second induction hypothesis for j = k gives
Rearranging, and using that T
If we multiply this by T
Substituting into (5) , this yields
again by the induction hypothesis.
For the last part, let We let M (i) denote the d i × t submatrix of M comprising the rows M j for j ∈ D i . We partition [t] into three groups:
If i ∈ T 1 , then M i has at most one positive and at most one negative entry; thus, we can keep the constraint M ip ≤ γ i unchanged. For i ∈ T 2 ∪T 3 , for every outgoing arc ij ∈ H , we shall define a constraint in the form v (i j) ⊤p ≥ δ (i j) . Further, for every i ∈ T 2 , we shall add an additional constraintp i ≤ κ i .
The construction is somewhat technical, even though the underlying idea is relatively simple. For each ij ∈ H , we wish to obtain the constraint v (i j) ⊤p ≥ δ (i j) such thatp j has a positive coefficient, p i has a nonpositive coefficient, and all other coefficients are 0. We wish to derive a valid constraint for (P F ) by taking a nonnegative combination of constraints from Mp ≥ −λ; recall from Lemma 6.1 that these are valid for (P F ). Lemma 6.2 shows that when we apply Gaussian elimination to a Z + -matrix, then we only add rows with nonnegative coefficients. Hence, if we apply Gaussian elimination to the matrix M, and apply the same operations to the right hand side −λ, then we can derive valid constraints from Mp ≥ −λ. In the construction that follows, we apply a permutation to a submatrix of M where in the penultimate step of Gaussian elimination produces a constraint of the desired form.
Let i ∈ T 2 ∪ T 3 , and d := d i . For every ij ∈ H , let us define a permutation σ (i j) of the set [t] as follows. We set σ (d − 1) = j, σ (d) = i, and fill the first d − 2 positions with the elements of D i \ {i, j} in such a way that for any ℓ ∈ D i \ {i}, there is an edge ℓ ′ ℓ ∈ H such that σ (ℓ) < σ (ℓ ′ ) ≤ d. The final t −d positions contain the elements of [t] \ D i in an arbitrary order. Let M (i j) ∈ R d ×t denote the matrix obtained from M (i) by applying the permutation σ (i j) to the rows and the columns, and deleting the last t − d rows.
It is easy to see that M (i j) is a Z + -matrix. Encoding length. We need to show that the encoding size ofM andb are polynomially bounded in the encoding size of M and b. This easily follows since the constraints are obtained by Gaussian elimination; we refer to [15] for strong polynomiality of Gaussian elimination.
Containment of P M . We show that everyp satisfying Mp ≤ γ is also feasible to (8) . For i ∈ T 1 , the constraint M ip ≤ γ i is identical to the i-th constraint in P M .
For i ∈ T 2 , let ij ∈ H be the edge used in the definition of κ (i) . According to Claim 6.1, the row N (i j) d has a single nonzero entry N (i j) dd = 1. Lemma 6.2 guarantees that the coefficient matrix Y (i j) is nonnegative. Therefore, the constraintp i ≤ κ (i) can be obtained as a nonnegative combination of the constraint set Mp ≤ γ , by multiplying M hp ≤ γ h for h ∈ D i by Y
The validity of the constraints v (i j) ⊤p ≥ δ (i j) follows similarly. Recall from Lemma 6.1 that Mp ≥ −λ is valid forp. The constraint v (i j) ⊤p ≥ δ (i j) is obtained by taking a nonnegative combination of the inequalities Mp ≥ −λ combining M hp ≥ −λ h for h ∈ D i with the nonnegative coefficient Y
. Hence, all these inequalities are valid forp.
Approximate reverse containment. We next show that ifp is feasible to (8) , thenp is feasible to B 2 P M , that is, Mp ≤ B 2 γ . Clearly, for i ∈ T 1 , M ip ≤ γ i ≤ B 2 γ i . The more difficult part is to show the validity of M ip ≤ B 2 γ i for i ∈ T 2 ∪ T 3 .
For i ∈ T 3 , we show that the constraints v (i j) ⊤p ≥ δ (i j) ∀j : ij ∈ H together imply M ip ≤ B 2 γ i . For i ∈ T 2 , we will also make use of the additional constraintp i ≤ κ (i) to derive M ip ≤ B 2 γ i . The following technical lemma will be needed. Lemma 6.3. Consider any i ∈ T 2 ∪ T 3 .
(i) There is a unique vector q (i) ∈ R t + such that M ℓ q (i) = 0 for all ℓ ∈ D i \ {i}, q 
CONCLUSIONS
We have given a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in linear exchange markets. We use the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm as a subroutine in a framework that repeatedly identifies revealed arcs. Before each iteration of this subroutine, we use another method to find a good starting solution for the current set of revealed arcs. The best solution here corresponds to the optimal solution of a linear program. Whereas no strongly polynomial algorithm is known for an LP of this form, we presented a strongly polynomial approximation by constructing a second LP.
It could be worth exploring whether this approach extends further. An immediate question is to see if one can use such an approach to obtain a ε-approximation of the LP in strongly polynomial time for every ε > 0. Further, such a method could be potentially useful for a broader class of LPs; a natural candidate would be systems of the form A ⊤ x ≤ c for a pre-Leontief matrix A [7] , a class where a pointwise maximal solution exists, but no strongly polynomial algorithm is known.
Our approach was specific to the market equilibrium problem. The method of identifying revealed arc sets originates from [40] . This result was applicable not only for the linear Fisher market model, but more generally, for minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives satisfying certain assumptions. It would be desirable to extend the current approach to a broader class of convex programs that include the formulation in [9] .
